Influence of Russia and China in Africa Minerals: Power, Risks, and Opportunities for the Continent

Africa has become the frontline of a new global competition. From cobalt and copper in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) to manganese, platinum, lithium, and rare earths across Southern and West Africa, the continent holds a decisive share of the world’s critical minerals. These resources are essential for electric vehicles, renewable energy, defense technologies, and advanced electronics. 

In this context, the influence of Russia and China in Africa minerals is reshaping geopolitics, supply chains, and domestic politics. Their expanding presence brings investment and security cooperation, but also raises serious questions about governance, sovereignty, and whether ordinary Africans will benefit from this new scramble for resources.

Why Africa’s Critical Minerals Matter

Africa’s mineral endowment is not just large — it is strategic:

• The DRC alone accounts for over 70% of global cobalt production and around half of known reserves. 
• African states collectively hold the majority of global reserves of platinum, a major share of manganese and chromium, and significant lithium deposits, all crucial for batteries, fuel cells, and renewable technologies. 

As highlighted in discussions on critical minerals in Africa, these resources are the backbone of the green transition and the digital economy, turning African mining belts into key arenas in the rivalry among global powers. 

For Russia and China, securing long-term access to these minerals is about more than business. It is about strategic leverage in a world where control of supply chains can translate into political influence.

China’s Strategy: Investment, Infrastructure, and Supply Chain Control

1. Dominance in Cobalt and Battery Metals

China is the most influential external actor in Africa’s critical minerals sector. Its companies dominate cobalt and copper production in the DRC and have aggressively expanded into lithium and rare earth projects across the continent.

• Chinese firms control the majority of large copper–cobalt mines in the DRC, with some estimates suggesting they influence around 70–80% of cobalt output through ownership stakes and off-take agreements. 
• Companies like CMOC (China Molybdenum) have continued to increase cobalt production in Congo, even during export restrictions, underscoring Beijing’s commitment to locking in supply for its battery and EV industries. 

This gives China a powerful position in the global value chain: African soil provides the ore, while Chinese refineries and manufacturers capture much of the added value through processing and battery production.

2. Infrastructure-for-Minerals Deals

China’s influence in Africa minerals is also built on infrastructure-for-resources agreements. These deals typically exchange mining rights for investments in roads, railways, energy, and public works.

• In the DRC, historic agreements granted Chinese companies access to copper and cobalt mines in return for promises of roads, hospitals, and other infrastructure. 
• Across the continent, Chinese state-backed firms have financed industrial parks, ports, and logistics corridors that directly serve mining and export operations. 

On paper, this model can support development. In practice, however, critics argue that execution has often fallen short: projects are delayed, local jobs are limited, and contracts lack transparency. Similar concerns appear in analyses of Congo’s mineral history, where foreign actors repeatedly secured favorable terms while Congolese citizens saw limited benefits. 

3. Strategic Alliances on “Green Minerals”

China has also moved to formalize its leadership through new diplomatic frameworks, recently proposing an international cooperation initiative on green minerals with several developing countries, including African states. 

This aligns with Beijing’s broader strategy: build coalitions with resource-rich partners, secure supply chains for its industries, and counter Western efforts to diversify away from Chinese processing and technology.

Russia’s Strategy: Resource-for-Security Deals and Political Leverage

If China’s influence of Russia and China in Africa minerals is primarily economic and industrial, Russia’s approach is more security-driven and political.

1. Private Security, Public Influence

Over the past decade, thousands of Russian security personnel and contractors have deployed to African countries facing insurgencies or internal conflict. 

• These operations, historically associated with the Wagner Group and now restructured under more direct state control, provide military training, combat support, and regime protection. 
• In return, Moscow often gains lucrative mining concessions, especially for gold, diamonds, and other high-value minerals in fragile states. 

This “resource-for-security” model allows Russia to entrench itself where governance is weak and Western influence has receded. The minerals may not always be classified as “critical” for green technologies, but they are crucial for revenue, sanctions evasion, and geopolitical bargaining.

2. Focus on Fragile States and Elite Deals

Russia tends to operate in countries with high instability, where leaders seek external support to maintain power. Deals are often struck with ruling elites, not through transparent public processes.

• Analyses of these arrangements warn of human rights abuses, opaque contracts, and limited community benefits, with security forces and contractors accused of serious violations. 
• Instead of building broad-based development, these partnerships can deepen dependency on authoritarian protection and entrench corrupt networks.

In this context, the influence of Russia and China in Africa minerals diverges: China builds long-term economic and industrial footprints, while Russia trades security for access and political alignment.

How the Influence of Russia and China in Africa Minerals Shapes Democracy and Governance

Existing analyses of African democracy emphasize how external actors can reinforce either reform or repression. 

When it comes to the influence of Russia and China in Africa minerals, three key governance challenges stand out:

1. Weak Institutions and Corruption

Critical mineral wealth, combined with powerful external partners, often fuels elite capture and corruption.

• In countries like the DRC, decades of opaque mining deals have contributed to high public debt, limited infrastructure, and persistent poverty, despite enormous export revenues. 
• Where institutions are weak, foreign companies and political elites can negotiate contracts that prioritize short-term profits over long-term national development.

China’s and Russia’s approaches, which rarely tie economic engagement to democratic reforms or transparency, can inadvertently (or intentionally) strengthen leaders who resist accountability.

2. Security Partnerships Without Democratic Conditions

Russian security arrangements, in particular, often bypass parliamentary oversight and public scrutiny. Governments justify them as necessary to fight insurgency or terrorism, but the absence of transparency makes it easier to trade away mineral rights without broad consent. 

Similarly, China’s emphasis on non-interference and state-to-state deals can encourage leaders to sidestep civil society and local communities when signing long-term mineral contracts.

3. Social and Environmental Consequences

The governance deficits show up on the ground as:

• Forced displacement of communities near mines
• Dangerous working conditions, including child labor in artisanal mining
• Pollution of land and water, with minimal remediation

These issues are documented in broader discussions on Africa’s critical minerals, which warn that without stronger regulation and enforcement, the continent risks repeating a familiar pattern: vast wealth under the soil, persistent poverty above it. 

The Wider Geopolitical Game: Where Do the U.S. and Others Fit?

The influence of Russia and China in Africa minerals has triggered responses from other powers, particularly the United States and the European Union.

One notable example is the U.S.–DRC–Zambia memorandum of understanding on building a regional value chain for electric vehicle batteries. The agreement aims to support local processing, infrastructure, and skills development rather than just raw mineral exports. 

If implemented well, such partnerships could offer African governments an alternative to one-sided deals by:

• Encouraging local refining and manufacturing
• Linking cooperation to labor standards, environmental safeguards, and governance reforms
• Creating space for civil society and communities to participate in oversight

However, these initiatives still face intense competition from China’s established presence and Russia’s entrenched security partnerships.

Turning Mineral Power into Development: What African States Can Do

Despite the imbalances, African governments are not powerless. The debate on critical minerals and democracy in Africa points to several paths forward. 

1. Renegotiate and Diversify Partnerships

African states can use the competing influence of Russia and China in Africa minerals to their advantage by:

• Renegotiating unfair contracts and revising fiscal terms
• Inviting multiple partners — including regional and South–South allies — to avoid over-dependence on any single power
• Insisting on local content requirements, technology transfer, and joint ventures that build domestic capacity

2. Move Up the Value Chain

Remaining merely a supplier of raw ore keeps Africa at the bottom of global value chains. Countries can:

• Invest in refining, processing, and even battery or component manufacturing, as proposed in DRC–Zambia initiatives
• Use regional frameworks like the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) to develop cross-border industrial corridors for minerals and green technologies 

This can help ensure that jobs, skills, and profits stay in Africa rather than being exported along with unprocessed minerals.

3. Strengthen Governance and Transparency

To ensure that the influence of Russia and China in Africa minerals supports development rather than exploitation, governments and citizens must push for:

• Public disclosure of mining contracts and royalty payments
• Stronger oversight bodies and independent judiciaries
• Enforcement of environmental and labor regulations
• Support for civil society organizations monitoring the sector

International initiatives on “responsible minerals” and due diligence can reinforce these efforts if they are aligned with local priorities, not imposed from outside. 

At the Crossroads of Power and Responsibility

The influence of Russia and China in Africa minerals reflects a broader global shift. As the world races to build electric cars, wind turbines, and advanced technologies, Africa stands at the center of critical mineral supply.

• China has built a powerful position through investment, infrastructure, and control of refining and manufacturing.
• Russia has leveraged security partnerships and mining concessions to gain political and economic footholds, particularly in fragile states.

These engagements bring opportunities — investment, infrastructure, and international attention — but also significant risks for governance, democracy, and the environment.

Whether Africa’s mineral wealth becomes a blessing or a curse will depend on the choices African leaders and citizens make now: demanding transparency, diversifying partnerships, adding value locally, and ensuring that resource wealth serves the many, not the few.

If those principles guide policy, the continent can transform critical minerals from a source of vulnerability into a foundation for sovereign, sustainable development in the decades ahead.